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UNDERSTANDING COLLEGIALITY ON THE COURT
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Emerson H. Tiller
While the merits of collegiality are often invoked, it is not a perfectly clear term. Collegiality has been defined as "a form of social
organization based on shared and equal participation of all its members. It contrasts with a hierarchical, pyramidal structure. ..." By
this definition, it is merely an organizational form, such as the Supreme Court, but takes no note of interactions among the members
of that structure. The more common understanding, though, considers the relationships among the members of the collegial body.
Villanova University, for example, has declared: "Collegiality entails
mutual understanding, respect, and trust among all these groups,
based upon their shared sense that it is in the common interest of all
to cooperate in promoting the general welfare and the mission of the
academic community." 2 In this vision, collegiality involves people cooperating in the interest of some greater group interest, rather than
pursuing their self-interest.
Academics typically put great importance on this sense of collegiality. In hiring decisions, we commonly evaluate whether an individual would make "a good colleague." In research, collaboration is
common in order to take advantage of varied strengths and diverse
insights. All this presumes that group production of a good is preferable to atomistic individual production. At least one study has con*

**

1

2

Herbert D. Kelleher Professor of Business Law, McCombs School of Business, University
of Texas; Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government,
University of Texas at Austin.
Stanford Clinton Sr. Research Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law;
Professor of Business Law, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University.
Trent University Department of Indigenous Studies, Key Terms, http://www.trentu.ca/
academic/nativestudies/courses/nast305/keyterms.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2007) (defining "collegiality" as used in the discourse of some educators).
Q CHUNG, VILLANOVA UNIv. FACULTY CONG., WHERE WE ARE REGARDING THE DEFINITION
OF "COLLEGIALITY" 3 (2006), http://www.villanova.edu/facultycongress/docs/collegiality.
pdf.

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTI IONAL LAW

[Vol. 10:2

firmed this presumption, finding that academic nurses operating in
collegial environments were more productive in research.3
In the context of the judiciary, Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C.
Circuit has suggested that collegiality is the manner in which "appellate judges overcome their individual predilections in decision making.''4 He criticized those who would capture judicial decision making solely through ideology, contending that they ignored this
collegiality effect and its moderation of individuals' ideological preferences. For Judge Edwards, collegiality means "that judges have a
common interest, as members of the judiciary, in getting the law
right, and that, as a result, we are willing to listen, persuade, and be
persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and respect." 5 It is borne
of "(a) experiences of duty and professional obligation, (b) understandings of shared purpose, (c) concerns about the maintenance of
corporate authority or legitimacy, and (d) participation in a routine-each of which suggest the presence of a kind of motivation
[that is] something other than rational, self-interested, strategic, and
calculating., 6 In this view, collegiality is juxtaposed against ideology
or strategy as a decision-making influence.
Judge Frank Coffin of the First Circuit takes a very similar approach to collegiality, describing it as judges working closely together
with "respect for the strengths of the others," with restraint on "one's
pride of authorship," with value placed on "understanding and compromise," and with engagement in the pursuit of "excellence in the
court's decision."'
For Judge Coffin, collegiality requires openminded responsiveness to the opinions of panel colleagues. It may be8
chilled by comments such as, "Nothing's going to change my mind.,
In the Edwards/Coffin conceptualization, collegiality is a rather
"warm and fuzzy" concept of sensitive, collaborative production
aimed at optimizing the result.
Much of the existing discussion of collegial courts has involved the
circuit courts, and the Supreme Court may not be the situs of much
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collegiality of this type. Oliver Wendell Holmes described the Court
as "nine scorpions in a bottle." 9 The Court has surely seen interpersonal conflict over the years, and disagreement is frequent. The Edwards/Coffin collegiality process, though, operates to some degree.
After a majority opinion author is assigned, he or she circulates a
draft opinion, after which other members of the Court circulate bargaining statements, agreeing to join the opinion if certain changes
are made.'0 Subsequently, a Justice may circulate a dissenting or concurring opinion in hopes of persuading other members of the Court,
or affecting the content of the majority opinion, and this action is not
infrequently successful."
Some features of the Supreme Court could encourage greater collegiality among the Justices than the level found in circuit courts. All
the Justices sit together for each case, unlike circuit courts where
panels vary widely. They all deliberate over the same cases, which
they themselves have selected on certiorari. There is necessarily some
collegial interaction on the Supreme Court, as "the justices are
locked into intricate webs of interdependence where the impulse to
speak in a personal voice must always be12 balanced against the need to
act collectively in order to be effective.'
Jan Crawford Greenburg's recent book on the Court reports that
Justice O'Connor was put off in her first Term by Justice Brennan,
but later unsettled by Justice Thomas. 3 By contrast, O'Connor felt
some affinity for and was influenced by Justice Marshall. 4 Greenburg
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reports more collegial relationships among other Justices, such as
Breyer and Kennedy,15 and Thomas reportedly influenced the decisions of Scalia. 16 Jeffrey Rosen reported thatJustice Breyer
could per7
suadejustice O'Connor through collegial discussion.
Tools are available to analyze the possible collegiality effects of
Supreme Court Justices. Lee Epstein and others have examined the
change, over time, in voting patterns of Supreme Court Justices, using Martin-Quinn scores. They demonstrate that the voting patterns
of Justices have changed over time, some quite significantly. Some
Justices have become more liberal (Blackmun, Souter, Stevens), while
others have become more conservative in their voting patterns
(Black, Frankfurter, White).is
While there are a variety of reasons why a Justice's personal ideological preferences may change, one explanation would be the composition of the Justice's colleagues. Thus, a persuasive and collegial
Justice, as Brennan was reputed to be, might exert a certain centripetal pull on the other Justices. A more antagonistic Justice might have
the opposite effect. This effect might be tested. The Epstein et al.
research on voting patterns is consistent with Greenburg's theory that
Justice Thomas pushed Justice O'Connor away-her leftwards turn
dates from about the time that he joined the Court. 9 Justice Kennedy, by contrast, did not become more liberal after this time.0
Thus, research on voting patterns may reveal collegiality effects. The
data regarding change in voting patterns over time also considered
only the direction of the vote, and evidence of collegiality (or lack
thereof) could be found in the willingness to issue separate opinions,
such as concurrences, even in the event of outcome agreement.
Another possible tool for measuring collegial interaction on the
Court would be the examination of voting fluidity, i.e., instances
where a Justice changed his or her mind over the course of Court deliberation. While there is no universal record of such fluidity at the
Court, there are conference notes of retired Justices that record the
15
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changes for some past time periods. Justice Burton's notes revealed
that twelve percent of the votes changed between conference and the
final decision.2 1 Some very important decisions can be explained by
post-conference vote changes. Perhaps this is evidence of collegial
persuasion at the Court.
The nature of voting fluidity has been empirically analyzed. The
conventional vision of collegiality would have judges drawn away from
their ideologies with persuasive legal arguments. Thus, there is a
story of Justice Brennan telling Justice Stewart, "I voted the other way
at conference but you've convinced me.''23 Walter Murphy proclaimed that "intellectual persuasion can play an important role" in
getting Justices to shift their positions.24 While this story is consistent
with the Edwards/Coffin theory of collegiality, the research shows
that the degree of ideological voting did not decline significantly between the time of the initial and final vote on the merits. 25 WhenJustices do shift, it is generally to a position that is ideologically proximate. 26 Most of the switching that occurs is by ajustice in a minority
position at conference, who changes to join the majority.2 This has
been called conformity voting, and it was more likely to occur in rela-
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tively less significant cases.2 s A more sophisticated multivariate study
found that a variety of features appeared to explain voting fluidity.
Central to these features was ideological closeness to the author of
the opinion joined in the switch, and other factors, including the
complexity of the case and the conformity voting tendency. The authors concluded that voting fluidity could be attributed to "policy
preferences and their strategic calculations."' '
This evidence does
not provide much support for the Edwards/Coffin collegial reasoning theory's operation at the Supreme Court level.
The papers at the Symposium do not employ the Edwards/Coffin
"warm and fuzzy" notion of collegiality. Instead, they adopt a more
hardheaded rational choice model of the Court's functioning. The
Articles do analyze collegiality in its broader definition, simply involving the interaction of (rough) equals in decision making. To the extent that they accurately describe reality, they call into at least some
question the descriptive reality of the Edwards/Coffin conceptualization.
The claim of Staudt, Friedman, and Epstein-that homogeneous
coalitions yield more dramatic legal outcomes-is a very plausible
one and supported by their empirical evidence. Given the wellknown influence of ideological predispositions on the votes of the
Justices,"1 one would expect this tendency to carry over into their
opinions. If so, the ideological makeup of the opinion's coalition
would be salient. Presumably, the motive for ideological voting is to
create an ideologically desired "law of the land." It is therefore quite
plausible that more ideologically consistent coalitions would produce
more ideological opinions that, in turn, are more significant, as measured by their press coverage scale. A more heterogeneous majority
coalition would be expected to require more compromise, compel-
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ling a more minimalist decision, which is of less obvious political salience.
The implications of these findings are quite murky. Although the
authors suggest that more ideological coalitions are the source of
more significant rulings, the directionality of the relationship is unclear. It is distinctly possible that ideologically salient cases, of the
sort that create rulings warranting press coverage, are precisely the
sort of cases that induce ideologically homogeneous alignments of
Justices. News coverage is generally not triggered by legal breakthroughs so much as by political salience. To the extent this is true,
the independent and dependent variables are simply measuring the
same thing, the ideological component of the opinion.
Another related possibility is that news coverage is cued by the
ideological alignment of the decision. When ideological Justices present a solid front, that very fact may signal to reporters that the decision is worthy of coverage. There is some "disordered voting" on the
Court, when a more conservative Justice votes for a more liberal outcome, while a more liberal Justice opts for a more conservative outcome.3 2 These will produce less homogeneous majority coalitions
and-according to Staudt, Friedman, and Epstein-less press coverage. One might expect these decisions to be more legalistic in significance (turning on, say, the proper standard for granting summary
judgment) and thus of less interest to newspaper readers. While a
decision on the standards for summary judgment could be extremely
consequential as a practical matter, it may lack the political interest
that motivates news coverage. Hence, it would be premature to conclude that ideological homogeneity is the cause of significant decisions, insofar as press coverage is just an indirect proxy for decision
significance, and the proxy may be a biased one.
Another question about the research lies in its operationalization.
The authors' conclusions make much of the fact that the key to opinions is found in the minimum majority. Five votes are all that is
needed to make law, as the authors themselves emphasize. They use
as their independent variable the ideological diversity of the entire
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majority coalition, rather than that of the five necessary core votes.
Yet, the ideological homogeneity of the five core Justices seems to be
the more appropriate measure.
Suppose a case is before the Court, and there are five conservative
Justices who wish to issue a dramatic ruling that substantially alters
the law. They, of course, will prefer the company of more moderate
Justices, thereby creating a larger majority behind their opinion.
However, they have little reason to water down the content of their
conservative opinion in order to attract the votes of the more moderate additional Justices. Additional Justices may in fact join the opinion, possibly to avoid the time and effort required to compile their
own concurrence or dissent, but it is not obvious that they have any
real influence on the content of the opinion, as the majority has little
incentive to compromise. 34 The five-Justice core majority will prevail,
regardless of the actions of any of the other Justices. If this scenario
is true, the measure of the homogeneity of the entire coalition will
not capture the appropriate effect; the key to the opinion lies in the
homogeneity of the five core Justices.
The authors control for majority coalition size, so their findings
are essentially that, as among seven-person coalitions, the more homogeneous the seven, the more likely the decision will be a significant one. Yet, for any given seven-person coalition, there would be a
still-more-homogeneous five-person subset of the coalition that could
have produced an even more significant opinion, under the authors'
theory that heterogeneity compromises decisional significance. The
seven-person coalition might be explained by the minimum winning
coalition's willingness to compromise their opinion in order to gain
more votes. But this answer would require a theory of why the additional votes were so valuable as to warrant a watering down of a fiveperson majority opinion. 35 Alternatively, the two might join the fiveperson minimum coalition opinion without compromise, in which
case the true measure of homogeneity would be that of the core five,
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rather than of the full coalition. If so, the authors' measure of homogeneity contains a built-in bias against larger opinion coalitions.
This effect raises interesting implications. Take an opinion coalition of seven, ranging from the most conservative Justice to a moderately liberal one. If the most cohesive core group of Justices is the
most conservative five, one could expect to see a very different opinion than if the more cohesive core five Justices are clustered around
the median, with the most conservative Justices being relative outliers.
This possible effect should be testable with the authors' data and
could reveal some interesting information. For example, it could
suggest whether more ideological or more moderate core coalitions
produce more significant opinions. Also, it could illuminate the
question of why opinion coalitions are often greater than five members, by identifying which Justices are outside the "core" of the decision's majority coalition.
While it is plausible that ideologically cohesive majority coalitions
write more significant opinions, it is also possible that the findings are
the product of a certiorari-level selection effect. Presumably, the Justices have a good ex ante idea of their colleagues' preferences. The
certiorari decision is influenced, at least in part, by the Justices' expectation of case outcome, should the case be taken.3 6 Thus, Justices
who dislike a lower court opinion might vote against certiorari, in
what is known as a "defensive denial," because they fear that the
Court might affirm.37 Conversely, Justices who are more confident
that the Court is aligned with their preferences will engage in "aggressive grants" of certiorari in an attempt to move the law.38
When there is a core of five closely aligned Justices, they should
have more confidence about case outcomes and consequently be
more likely to accept the review of highly significant cases. One
would expect those Justices to engage in more aggressive grants of salient issues, due to this confidence about the outcome. Staudt,
Friedman, and Epstein account for this effect in their introduction,
where they observe that the Court taking a case in a significant issue
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area, such as the nature of Mirandarights, does not always yield a significant decision.
Yet another variable, not analyzed by the authors, may help explain the results on opinion salience. The central significance of the
Court's opinion lies in its doctrinal power. This in turn relies on its
implementation in the future, primarily by lower courts. While we
presume that lower courts are largely obedient to Supreme Court decisions, 0 they also have ideological preferences that influence their
decisions.4 ' Lower courts may engage in "shirking," which avoids the
true holding of the Supreme Court. They may frame the facts, so as
to avoid the Court's opinion content, or perhaps find ways to distinguish the Court's opinion to limit its power. A rational Supreme
Court would attend to the probability of faithful implementation of
its opinion.
The composition of lower courts should therefore influence the
content of the Court's opinion.3 Suppose that the Supreme Court is
primarily conservative in its ideological attitudes. If the lower courts
are likewise conservative, the Supreme Court should be relatively emboldened in its opinions, pronouncing more salient conservative
opinions. However, if the lower courts are relatively liberal, the
Court might adopt a more cautious opinion that would be more
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faithfully applied in future decisions. An unpublished study44 suggests
that the Court is in fact influenced by circuit court opinions.
Similarly, the Court may be influenced by the preferences of other
institutions, such as Congress. 5 Congress possesses a variety of tools
to punish the judiciary for opinions it considers undesirable, and
there46is some evidence that the Supreme Court responds to this concern.
It would be interesting to add variables for contemporary
lower court and congressional preferences to see if they have affected
the Supreme Court's willingness to issue ideologically salient opinions.
Landa
diffeent and Lax•47tackle the collegiality question from an entirely
different perspective. Their Article recognizes that cases present a
series of distinct legal issues for judges to address. At a minimum,
every case presents at least one issue of fact and one of law, and
judges may disagree on either or both. Moreover, the typical case has
multiple factual issues, and each legal issue may have multiple dimensions to be applied to the facts. They analyze how these dimensions
cumulate to produce an outcome, though they do not focus on the
nature of the resulting opinion.
The implication of the multiple dimensions is a recognition that
some measure of collegial agreement is necessary for there to be a
majority opinion. While a majority of'judges might agree on the outcome, it is unlikely that they would agree precisely on the exact state
of the law or every word written in an opinion. Hence, the judges
joining such an opinion must surely make some compromise of their
preferences.
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In this approach, some collegiality plays an important role in the
opinion, even when the judges all agree on the outcome. In theory,
each judge might write a separate opinion, setting out his or her
views on both the facts and the law. There is considerable pressure,
however, for the judges to make some compromise on their underlying dimensional preferences, and not to issue seriatim opinions, in
order to create a clearer governing legal standard (and to avoid the
considerable work associated with consistently writing separate opinions). A judge will be better off compromising on some issues in order to join a majority than in refusing to compromise and issuing a
lonesome opinion.
In the conventional, one-dimensional model, it is the median
voter that governs the content of the opinion.4 ' Forjudicial opinions,
this is presumed to be the ideological median judge. However, there
are various reasons to believe that the median voter does not universally prevail, one of which is addressed by Landa and Lax-the multiplicity of dimensions associated with writing a judicial opinion.49 As
the authors note, judges may favor the same outcome in a given case
for very different reasons. If all of the dimensions are monotonic in
the same direction, the median voter might still control, but this is
not necessarily the case. In the ideal, at least, factual disputes would
not have any such ideologically monotonic orientation. Rather than
the outcome being controlled by the median voter, it may be a product of unique case circumstances. In addition to case facts, those circumstances could include the coincidental nature of the legal rules.
One other complicating feature to be considered by the model is
the judiciary's ability to control the dimensions they address in an
opinion. Although the legal issues in a case are defined in the first
instance by the litigants and their briefs, the judiciary is able to alter
or go beyond these choices. This notion has been called "issue fluid50
Appellate judges have some discretion in picking and choosing
ity."
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Supreme Court, in making decisions on the merits, provides authoritative answers to legal
questions that have not been asked .... ").
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the issues they will address in a given case. This manipulation of issues at the Supreme Court level "occurs quite often."5' The Justices
engage in "issue creation" of questions not presented in the briefs
and "issue suppression," whereby they ignore some of the questions
presented to them.'
Landa and Lax also model judicial preferences on particular dimensions as immutable and un-amenable to persuasion, which is contrary to the evidence on voting fluidity at the Court and assumes away
the possibility of Edwards/Coffin persuasive collegiality, as well as ignoring possible strategic decision making by the Justices. An interesting documented example of the latter fact is found in Craig v.
Boren.54 The case involved the constitutional standard for gender discrimination as one dimension, and Justice Brennan's initial position
argued for a strict scrutiny standard. Unable to cobble together a majority for this position, though, he moderated his view on this standard in order to gain a majority for a lowered standard of scrutiny. 5"
Although such dimensional fluidity may not be common, it probably
occurs more often as an anticipatory manner; for example, opinion
authors moderate their dimensional preferences with knowledge of
the reaction from otherJustices.
Landa and Lax do not analyze the creation of precedential rules,
but they do scrutinize the application of such precedents, and how
different sorts of rules should yield different results, even when the
deciding judges' preferences are the same. For example, a rule requiring that a plaintiff satisfy standards A and B and C will often yield
different results than a rule simply requiring a plaintiff to satisfy standards A or B or C. This intuitive finding reveals the importance of
opinions and legal rules, as distinct from mere case outcomes.
The Article assumes a certain level ofjudicial sincerity that may be
unrealistic. Suppose ajudge, operating under the former rule, wants
to vote for a plaintiff, out of some sense of fairness. Perhaps the
judge honestly does not believe that the plaintiff satisfied standard C.
Such a judge might nevertheless find that standard C was met, in order to rule for the plaintiff. The judge could do this by dishonestly
presenting the facts of the case, to make it appear that standard Cwas
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satisfied. Alternatively, the judge might write an opinion that waters
down the requirements of standard C, making it an easier threshold
to satisfy.
Indeed, it is not obvious that Justices attend to the dimensions in
isolation, as the theory propounds. To the extent the Justices are
ideologically oriented to outcomes, they would begin by choosing an
ideologically preferred outcome or party. 56 This result could then be
rationalized via an opinion addressing the separate dimensions, as
projected by the attitudinal model. To the extent that the majority
outcome incorporates significant differences on the underlying dimensions, the disagreement may be finessed through issue fluidity
and suppression, or simply by taking an inconclusive approach to an
underlying dimension.
The Landa and Lax theory might also be influenced by lower
court compliance issues or congressional reactions. It presumes that
Supreme Court Justices' opinions on the content of particular issues
in the opinion are driven by the Justices' own sincere preferences,
such as ideological desires. Yet the Justices may be driven to adopt a
contrary position on these issues, out of concern for the effective implementation of their opinion.
The two very different Articles reviewed contribute to the theory
and practice of collegial decision making on multimember courts.
Staudt, Friedman, and Epstein demonstrate how ideology is an important component of collegial interaction at the Supreme Court,
and how it affects the ultimate product of the Court. Landa and Lax
add the important understanding of multiple legal issue dimensions
in the collegial balance, a factor overlooked by much of the existing
literature.
In an important way, Landa and Lax and Staudt, Friedman, and
Epstein converge on a similar point: to the extent that collegiality is
about consistency and durability of legal policy over time and across
courts, it is unlikely to happen if the court that originates the decision is ideologically or otherwise fractured on important dimensions
of the broader subject matter at dispute. Landa and Lax illustrate,
theoretically, that a legitimate collegial legal rule may be impossible
when individual judges on a panel disagree about anything more
than the facts of the case. Landa and Lax argue that the most fun-
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This corresponds to the Supreme Court's practice, which begins with a preliminary vote
on the merits taken at conference, before any of the underlying dimensions are analyzed.
Of course, it is possible that the role of the dimensions has already been analyzed at the
time of this vote.
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damental features of legitimate legal rules-predictability, stability,
consistency, and non-arbitrariness-may not exist at the collegial
level when judges have differences over such things as the relevance
of various case dimensions or thresholds for application of rules in
those dimensions. This is so even when they come to an agreement
on the individual case outcome. The process of aggregating the
preferences of individual judges over various policy dimensions, legal
dimensions, and thresholds within those dimensions inevitably leads
to an unstable statement of legal policy. Staudt, Friedman, and Epstein illustrate a similar result empirically. They find that court majorities that have few differences across legal and policy goals-that is,
an ideologically homogeneous court-can produce a more "consequential" decision, essentially a decision that produces a consistent
legal analysis that will have greater longevity and legitimacy, than can
a court that is more heterogeneous on legal and policy goals.
Neither Article truly comes to grips with the more conventional
"warm and fuzzy" Edwards/Coffin concept of collegiality. This is entirely understandable, if only because this Edwards/Coffin concept is
much more difficult to measure or model. Perhaps this collegial
concept does not indeed apply in practice, and judges may be singleminded seekers of their preexisting preferences (whether ideological
or legal). Although there are some clear examples of the collegial
practice, its use may not be common, and the evidence of ideological
voting at the Supreme Court calls the concept into some question at
that level of the judicial hierarchy. Still, we do not really know much
about this practice, and the dispute illustrates a shortcoming of social
science research practices, which focus on that which is more readily
measurable, and may overlook features less amenable to measure using social scientific methods.

